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HIGHER LAW SECULARISM: RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS, CONTESTED
SECULARISMS, AND THE LIMITS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
ZACHARY R. CALO*
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers whether religious symbols on public property
might serve a permissible role within the secular polity, and whether there
is a way to understand such symbols as compatible with secular commit-
ments. While some attention will be given to constitutional issues, it is
proposed that the jurisprudential incoherence in this area is less the result
of legal interpretation and technique than with the way in which law has
framed the concept of the secular. We are not facing a crisis in the Estab-
lishment Clause so much as a crisis in the secular.1 The aim of the paper is
thus to explore how achieving greater coherence in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, and thereby making law an agent of constructive political
engagement rather than a fomenter of religious culture wars, will require a
rethinking of the secular.
The central claim of this paper is thai a binary approach to the secular
has created a sharp and irresolute cleavage within legal discourse about
religious symbols. There are two dominant traditions of understanding the
secular, both with long genealogical resonance in western thought: Chris-
tian secularity and secularism. Constitutional debate has commonly framed,
both implicitly and explicitly, the issue of religious symbols as demanding
resolution in favor of one of these traditions. Rather than offering a way to
overcome the divide and the culture war it encourages, the Court's juris-
prudence has concretized the binary.
Whatever the relative intellectual merits of these two traditions-and
the purpose of this paper is not to advance a normative position on the mat-
ter-neither has proven able to attract adequate cultural buy-in. One links
the secular with a theological narrative that, to many, is narrow, exclusion-
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. Ph.D. candidate, Universi-
ty of Virginia; Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; M.A.,
The Johns Hopkins University; B.A., The Johns Hopkins University.
1. On the crisis in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see generally BRUCE LEDEWITZ,
CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM (2011).
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ary and fundamentally incompatible with the basic precepts of an open
liberal society. The other defines the secular as standing over and against
religion in a manner that fails to resonate with historical practices and the
religious convictions of many citizens. What is instead needed is a way of
conceptualizing the secular that opens the Establishment Clause to new
forms of meaning. The primary aim of this paper is to offer such an ac-
count, which will be described as higher law secularism.
In developing the idea of higher law secularism, the paper largely by-
passes any sustained engagement with the technical jurisprudential ques-
tions implicated by the Establishment Clause debate. It is not that such
questions are unimportant, but the concern of this paper is not with advanc-
ing a particular theory of constitutional interpretation in any formal sense.
Rather, this paper aims to relocate the jurisprudential problematic within a
more fundamental debate over the meaning of the secular. The paper is thus
relatively modest in the constructive proposal its advances. Higher law
secularism is not a set of principles so much as a way of conceptualizing
the relationship of religion, and moral commitments more generally, to
secular life and politics. It offers a methodology for framing the problemat-
ic more than a definitive resolution to it. While rethinking the secular on its
own will not solve all of the contested issues involving religious symbols, it
will go some way towards clarifying the framework of a resolution. Until
there is greater agreement on the nature of the secular, the Establishment
Clause will remain embedded within a divisive culture war.
In the end, this paper is therefore less about symbols than how ac-
counts of the secular shape the Establishment Clause. There are a number
of case studies that might be used to pursue this inquiry, but religious sym-
bols provide an entry into the most elemental features of the debate over
the nature and foundation of legal secularism. The subject of religious
symbols, perhaps more than any other subject, precipitates a confrontation
over the ontological character of the modem legal order and the secular
space created out of the great separation of law and religion.
I. VARIETIES OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIAN SECULARITY AND SECULARISM
The governing claim of this paper is that resolving the crisis in Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence must begin with rethinking legal secularism.
However, this project demands that we begin by interrogating the meaning
of the secular, itself a confused and contested concept. As Charles Taylor
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observes, "[i]t is not entirely clear what is meant by secularism." 2 Thus,
simply discussing the secular is unhelpful because divergent accounts of
the secular have emerged from within historically constructed and contin-
gent social imaginaries. There are different secularisms competing to repre-
sent the authentic inheritance of modernity.3 This contest within modernity
stands as a necessary backdrop to the cultural and jurisprudential debate
over religious symbols.
Within the United States, and the West more broadly, there have been
two regnant traditions that have shaped debate within law, politics and
culture about the meaning of the secular.4 These two traditions are some-
times referred to as secularity and secularism. 5 Following this custom, Brett
Scharffs describes the two concepts in this way:
Both secularity and secularism are linked to the general historical pro-
cess of secularization, but as I use the terms, they have significantly dif-
ferent meanings and practical implications. By "secularity" I mean an
approach to religion-state relations that avoids identification of the state
with any particular religion or ideology (including secularism itself) and
that endeavours to provide a neutral framework capable of accommodat-
ing a broad range of religions and beliefs. By "secularism," in contrast, I
mean an ideological position that is committed to promoting a secular
order.6
Scharffs further illustrates this distinction by linking the United States
with the tradition of secularity and French laicit6 with the tradition of secu-
larism. 7 I follow this distinction between secularity and secularism and find
it to be a useful paradigm for interpreting different modes of relating law
and religion. At the same time, I want to offer an even more elemental dis-
tinction within the secular that informs both its intellectual genealogy and
its expression within legal systems. This distinction is ultimately theologi-
cal in nature, for it concerns the relationship of law and political order to
divine economy. In particular, what is ultimately at issue in this divide is
whether or not secular politics derives its grounding and logic from reli-
gious warrant. The two sides of this debate discussed below are the tradi-
tions of Christian secularity and secularism.
2. Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31 (Rajeev Bhargava
ed., Oxford, 4th impr. 2005).
3. See Generally Brett G. Scharffs, Four Views of the Citadel: The Consequential Distinction
between Secularity and Secularism, 6 RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 110.
6. Id. at 109, 110-11.
7. Idat Ill.
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A. The Idea of Christian Secularity
The genealogy of the secular typically commences with reference to
the rise of science and reason in the Enlightenment.8 The underlying as-
sumption is that the secular emerged out of modernity as it moved to re-
place the orders of Christendom. The secular, in this respect, is understood
as being necessarily defined against religious politics. Along these lines,
Ian Benson notes that, "[t]he secular as most people now understand it is a
deeply anti-religious creation." 9 Yet this account captures only one dimen-
sion of the history of the secular. In fact, Benson argues, "[t]he idea that
'secular' means 'non-religious' is a departure from its original meaning and
challenges the idea that religion has a place in the public sphere."' 0 A full
genealogy of the secular begins not with the Enlightenment, but with the
Christianity's engagement with the ancient world. As Robert Markus has
argued, "The sacred and the profane were both familiar in antiquity; but
until it was imported by Christianity, there was no notion of the 'secular' in
the ancient world. The word and the concept are both alien to Greco-
Roman religion."" Against the Enlightenment-focused narrative, the first
emergence of the secular in the West took place not against Christianity,
but through it.
The idea of the secular as it emerged out of Christianity was, on one
level, a political construct. With the rise of a Christian polity under Con-
stantine, the link between politics and sacrifice that defined Rome, indeed
all prior civilizations, was severed.12 At the heart of Constantine's political
legacy, Peter Leithart argues, was the ending of pagan sacrifice and thus
the loosening of political and civic identify from the sacrificial act. 13 This
desacralization inaugurated a civilizational shift in which the state and its
powers were deprived of eschatological significance and left radically rela-
tivized in light of Christian proclamation. The secular legal and political
history of the West might be thus read as a footnote to this Constantinian
legacy. It is, of course, a long road from desacralization to the modern lib-
eral state, and the full logic of Christian insight would not be revealed until
the dawning of modernity-a point that emphasizes the ineluctable link
between Christian secularity and Enlightenment secularism-but the seeds
8. Ian T. Benson, That False Struggle between Believers and Non-Believers, OASIS, Dec. 12,
2010, at 24.
9. Id. at 22.
10. Id.
11. ROBERT A. MARKUS, CHRISTIANITY AND THE SECULAR 4 (2006).
12. See generally PETER J. LEITHART, DEFENDING CONSTANTINE: THE TWILIGHT OF AN EMPIRE
AND THE DAWN OF CHRISTENDOM (2010).
13. Id.
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of the modem secular political order were first established within Christi-
anity.14
Another aspect of the Christian transformation was conceptual and
theological. The secular, in this early understanding, referred not to a space
defined against religion but merely that which was profane and ordinary,
that is, spatially and jurisdictionally separate from the sphere of ecclesial
activity. Along these lines, Pope Benedict recently noted that, "[i]n the
Middle Ages, 'secularity,' a term coined to describe the condition of the
ordinary lay Christian who belonged neither to the clerical nor to the reli-
gious state, inferred opposition between the civil powers and the ecclesias-
tical hierarchies."15 The secular, in other words, speaks merely to the fact
there are spheres of society that properly possess jurisdictional autonomy
from the Church. 16 As such, the emergent Christian idea of the secular did
not rest upon a "radical opposition to the sacred."1 7 While the secular con-
stituted a space apart from the church, it nevertheless found its meaning,
foundation, and logic within a theological account of the world. Jurisdic-
tional autonomy was not equated with ontological autonomy. It is in this
respect that theologian Oliver O'Donovan can propose that the "secular
community has no ground of its own on which it may simply exist apart. It
is either opened up to its fulfillment in God's love, or it is shut down."18
The sustentation of what Pope Benedict has recently referred to as a
"healthy secularity" therefore finds its meaning within the bounds a Chris-
tian theological economy.19
14. Secularism might properly be viewed as a dependent tradition that is inexplicable apart from
Christian secularity. One commentator has gone so far as to describe secularism as "the latest expres-
sion of the Christian religion." See GRAEME SMITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF SECULARISM 2 (Tauris,
2008).
15. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Participants in the 56th National Study Congress Orga-
nized by the Union of Italian Catholic Jurists, THE VATICAN, Dec. 9, 2006 [hereinafter Benedict Ad-
dress], available at
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedictxvilspeeches/2006/december/documents/hf ben xvi spe
20061209_giuristi-cattolicien.html.
16. Following this tradition of thought, one commentator has recently argued that, "[g]iven a right
understanding of secularism as the separation of religion from public life and the separation of church
and state as nothing more than formal institutional independence of church and state, citizens should
value church-state separation as the healthier and more justifiable state of affairs." HUNTER BAKER,
THE END OF SECULARISM 20 (2009).
17. MARKUS, supra note 11, at 5.
18. OLIVER O'DONOVAN, COMMON OBJECTS OF LOVE: MORAL REFLECTION AND THE SHAPING
OF COMMUNITY: 2001 STOB LECTURES 24 (2002) (emphasis added).
19. Benedict Address, supra note 15.
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B. The Idea of Secularism
The West gave rise to another understanding of the secular that came
to be defined largely over and against the tradition of Christian secularity.
This alternative tradition that we will denominate secularism severed the
elemental connection between theology and the secular that had been the
hallmark of Christian secularity. This impulse found expression in the rise
of the modern state following the Wars of Religion, with its aim of a politi-
cal space largely autonomous from religion and theologically-inspired vio-
lence. The logic pregnant in this early secularism was given more complete
expression in later Enlightenment thought. The first use of the term secular-
ism was by George Holyoake in 1851 as a way to explicitly minimize the
public and political influence of religion.20 It was at this point that the term
secularism acquired the meaning it holds in contemporary vernacular.
This intellectual lineage aside, there is no one uniform account of sec-
ularism. Even within the American context, Kent Greenawalt argues,
"[s]ecularism can be a confusing and slippery term." 21 Yet, what is com-
mon to the various expressions of secularism is that each represents "a way
of thinking about the world and life which makes no reference to supernat-
ural belief."22 While the secular as defined within Christian secularity is
derived from a theological account of creation, the secular of secularism is
increasingly freestanding and defined by its own logic. At its most basic,
secularism thus describes "the world created by the intellectual rebellion
against political theology in the West."23 Secularism is a revolt against the
imaginative universe birthed by the tradition of Christian secularity and its
representation of the secular as a space made sensible within a theological
order.
This paper is concerned principally with secularism's expression as a
doctrine of the state that "strains the metaphysics out of politics." 24 At the
same time, it is artificial to separate political secularism from secularism as
a more totalizing moral system. 25 Secularism, in this latter form, aims to
advance a new form of moral order. Secularism is thus not a mere political
settlement but the outworking of a broader strategy to effect the deeper
20. Benson, supra note 9, at 24.
21. Kent Greenawalt, Secularism, Religion, and Liberal Democracy in the United States, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 2383, 2383 (2009).
22. SMITH, supra note 14, at 22.
23. MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE MODERN WEST 6 (2007).
24. WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, WHY I AM NOT A SECULARIST 22 (1999).
25. ELIZABETH S. HURD, THE POLITICS OF SECULARISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 13-15
(2007).
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ontological separation of the legal and religious. Within this order, law
comes to possess its own logic unrelated to any supervening moral system,
while religion is relegated to the private sphere. As Jurgen Habermas writes
in describing the political consequences of this arrangement, "the constitu-
tion of the liberal state can satisfy its own need for legitimacy in a self-
sufficient manner, that is, on the basis of the cognitive elements of a stock
of arguments that are independent of religious and metaphysical tradi-
tions." 26
These two concepts of the secular-Christian secularity and secular-
ism--continue to shape contemporary legal and political discourse. One
tradition seeks to maintain a foundational link between the secular and the
religious. The other advances a more totalizing rupture. While having dis-
tinct histories-one in Christianity's encounter with the ancient word, the
other in the Enlightenment break with Christendom-the echoes of these
two broad traditions have established the lines of debate over the moral
structure of modernity and its liberal political institutions. The debate is not
a battle over the validity of the secular itself, but rather over the character
of modernity. It is against this backdrop that the significance of legal con-
tests over religious symbols becomes clearer, for at issue is the basic ques-
tion of whether there exists some necessary point of contact between liberal
separationism and a theological economy.
II. THE FORMATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION
The dueling history of Christian secularity and secularism has a dis-
tinctive American chapter that is important for understanding the problems
afflicting contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It is argued
that the current jurisprudential quagmire reflects the loss of common pat-
terns of thought and practice that had previously created a stable environ-
ment within which to understand the relationship between law and religion.
The particularly divisive character of the current legal debate, framed as a
binary choice between Christian secularity and secularism, has emerged out
of the void that resulted from the breakdown of a shared American cultural
self-understanding.
A tradition emerged during the nineteenth century to govern the rela-
tionship between church and state in American law and public life.27 This
American tradition was deeply influenced by elements of Christian secular-
26. JORGEN HABERMAS, JOSEPH RATZINGER & FLORIAN SCHULLER, THE DIALECTICS OF
SECULARIZATION: ON REASON AND RELIGION 29 (2005).
27. Thomas Berg, Religious Displays and the Voluntary Approach to Church and State, 63 OKLA.
L. REv. 47, 49 (2010).
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ity, but it also took this tradition in new and creative directions in response
to the secularist tradition. This American tradition, which Thomas Berg
defines as the "voluntarist tradition," rested on two foundational princi-
ples.28 First, the state maintained no jurisdiction over religious matters. 29
The state and the church existed as separate loci of social meaning and
activity. In this respect, the tradition was thoroughly grounded in modem
notions of the separation. Yet, at the same time, religion was of foundation-
al importance to politics and public life, not only as the guarantor of moral-
ity and virtue but as an essential factor in preserving the principles by
which law and religion operated in discrete social spheres.30 While pos-
sessing its own authority and operating according to its own internal logic,
law was nevertheless connected-symbolically and ultimately ontological-
ly-to a supervening moral order.
This American tradition might be understood as the outworking of a
long history of Christian insight concerning the scope of government au-
thority and the character of the secular. Certainly in its recognition of the
ineluctable importance of religion to the sustentation of democratic life and
culture, the American tradition maintained links with foundational insights
of Christian secularity. But the American tradition was not a mere parroting
of Christian secularity, for its strong commitment to disestablishment
marked a unique turning point in the western tradition. The American con-
stitutional order was secular in a completely new way, for it broke with
aspects of Christian political theology that extended to the early medieval
church.3' As Martin Marty writes,
[s]hortly before independence, the Americans were still living off a four-
teen-hundred-year old charter. This charter went back to the emperor
Constantine, in the fourth century; its theoretical base had been provided
by St. Augustine. According to this reading, religion was established by
law. Establishment meant official favor and status. The government en-
couraged one religion and discouraged or prosecuted all others.32
By denying any such competence or authority to the new federal govern-
ment, the United States Constitution shattered a fundamental precept of
Christendom. In brief, the achievement of the American tradition was
28. Id. at 56.
29. Id. at 51.
30. Id at 53.
31. Steven Green notes that, "[iln 1800, the United States represented the only secular government
on earth, revolutionary France excepted. Formal, political disestablishment was the rule at the national
level and all but complete among the states." STEVEN GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT 9
(2010).
32. MARTIN MARTY, RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE: THE PROTESTANT EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 35-36
(1970).
818 [Vol 87:3
HIGHER LA WSECULARISM
based in a tension-a tension between acknowledging the state as having
no jurisdiction over religion, even as this proposition rested on the cultural
residue of Christian political insight. Aspects of both Christian secularity
and Enlightenment secularism mingled in new and creative ways. Resting
on a kind of circular logic in which strong religion was the foundation of a
democratic order that made religious freedom possible, the inherent tension
of this system served through the nineteenth century as a source of dynamic
(if also sometimes violent and exclusionary) energy. It was this tension that
shaped the American understanding of the relationship between law and
religion within the bounds of a secular polity.
Christianity and liberty had of course been culturally, politically and
intellectually linked from the beginnings of the United States.33 Yet, the
development of the American tradition of church-state relations in the nine-
teenth century brought about a settlement not entirely congruous with
themes of the Founding Era. The American tradition was not a mode of
understanding that flowed necessarily and ineluctably from the First
Amendment, but rather a historically constructed model rooted in the par-
ticular impulses of a cultural moment. A shift occurred in the brief decades
following 1789 that injected new meaning into the emergent constitutional
order. "A defacto establishment grew," Marty argues, "where the old legal
one had fallen." 34 Under this defacto establishment, the line between pub-
lic religion and the non-confessional state was often porous, 35 and the pro-
motion of Christianity was not widely deemed to be incompatible with a
principled opposition to a state church. 36 It was not until the nineteenth
century, for instance, that there emerged a strong account of America as a
Christian nation. 37 It was the emergence of this Christian nationalism in law
33. Along these lines, Nathan Hatch observes, "American churches did not face the kind of exter-
nal social and political pressures that in Great Britain often forced Christianity and liberty to march in
opposite directions." NATHAN O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 8
(1989).
34. MARTY, supra note 32, at 44.
35. See generally DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE AND ORIGINAL INTENT196-262
(2010).
36. As Marty observes,
"[e]ven within a single document the two interests relating to the one opinion coexisted. The
Supreme Court of Maine in 1854 declared that the state 'knows no religion' and cited eight
religions to prove that all possessed equal religion... but then went on to uphold the reading
of the Protestant King James Version of the scriptures in public schools, even though Catho-
lics were protesting the practice.
MARTY, supra note 32, at 44.
37. Jon Butler, Why Revolutionary America Wasn't a Christian Nation, in RELIGION AND THE
NEW REPUBLIC: FAITH IN THE FOUNDING OF AMERICA (James H. Hutson cd.). Butler also observes that,
"[a]s Christianization advanced in America, new and sometimes ugly demands for government guaran-
tees of Christian hegemony emerged rather than receded." JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH:
CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 284 (1990).
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and culture that undergirded the American tradition, as the maturation of
American self-identity went hand-in-hand with the construction of Christi-
anity as the source and foundation of democratic life. The cause of Ameri-
can liberty was linked with the cause of Christianity.
As it first took shape in the nineteenth century, the American tradition
advanced a distinctly and narrowly Protestant nationalism. 38 It was a robust
Protestantism, expressed culturally and institutionally, that gave shape and
support to the American tradition of secularity. In fact, the American tradi-
tion not only named Protestantism as the exclusive foundation of American
democracy, but actively defined itself against other faiths, especially Ca-
tholicism. The noted Unitarian minister Theodore Parker summarized a
common line or argument when writing in 1854 that, "[t]he Roman Catho-
lic Church. . .denies spiritual freedom, liberty of mind or conscience, to its
members. It is therefore the foe of all progress; it is deadly hostile to De-
mocracy." 39 Yet, while initially defined by an exclusionary impulse, the
American tradition also possessed a certain elasticity. In fact, an important
part of the drama of the American tradition was the effort of other faith
traditions to draw themselves into the tapestry of American democratic life.
Perhaps no challenge more defined American Catholic life in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries than establishing the church's basic
synchronicity with the principles of the American tradition. The noted
Catholic convert Orestes Brownson, in his 1865 book The American Re-
public, wrote that "the United States have a religious as well as a political
destiny, for religion and politics go together. Church and state, as govern-
ments, are separate indeed, but the principles on which the state is founded
have their origin and ground in the spiritual order-in the principles re-
vealed or affirmed by religion-and are inseparable from them."40 He went
on to affirm, against the practices of "the sectarian and schismatic states of
the Old World," that the American Catholic church "can deal with people
as free men, and trust them as freemen." 41 The moral theologian John Ryan
advanced this line of argument in the opening decades of the twentieth
century. In numerous publication, and most systematically in his book The
State and the Church, Ryan not only argued for the basic compatibility of
Catholicism and religious freedom but also for the church's essential role in
preserving the moral foundations of American liberal politics. 42 In fact,
38. See generally MARTY, supra note 32.
39. JOHN McGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 34 (2003) (internal quotations
omitted).
40. ORESTES BROWNSON, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 257 (2003).
41. Id. at 263.
42. JOHN A. RYAN & MOORHOUSE F. X. MILLAR, THE STATE AND THE CHURCH (1922).
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Ryan went so far as to claim that Catholicism had reached a point where it
must seize from Protestantism the task of serving as public faith for Ameri-
can democracy.43
The Catholic experience was one episode in the expansion of the
American tradition beyond Protestantism, and part of the larger reconstitu-
tion of American religion along the lines of Protestant-Catholic-Jew. 44 It
reveals the native flexibility in the American tradition, as the uneasy blend-
ing of disestablishment and public religion expanded to encompass other
theological traditions in the form of a new postwar consensus. This balance
held, and was indeed sensible, so long as there existed a broadly religious
culture to support it. Yet, this consensus no longer holds, pressured on dif-
ferent sides by the forces of pluralism, secularism, and resurgent religion.
The result is that the underlying logic of the American tradition ceases to
be compelling to some significant segments of the population. That which
held together separationism and public religiosity has been lost, depriving
American public life of a common basis by which to adjudicate the mean-
ing of the secular.
The fragmentation of the American tradition has placed a revivified
Christian secularity and a radicalized secularism in fundamental conflict.
Even more significantly, this fragmentation has pushed deliberation about
the meaning of the secular ever more deeply into the realm of law and poli-
tics. As James Hunter observes, "a thinning consensus of substantive be-
liefs and dispositions in the larger culture" has produced "a turn towards
politics as a foundation and structure for social solidarity." 45 What cannot
be achieved at the level of cultural self-understand is now sought through
the coercive agency of the state. "Each and every faction in society,"
Hunter argues, "seeks the patronage of state power as a means of imposing
its particular understanding of the good on the whole of society." 46 No
issue has maintained a more significant role in this political contest than the
Establishment Clause, which has become the primary venue within which
the meaning of the secular is deliberated. What the American tradition once
accomplished through soft consensus now occurs through coercive politics.
The jurisprudence involving religious symbols, in turn, has become a refer-
endum on the two traditions that have shaped the meaning of the divorce of
43. Zachary R. Calo, The Indispensable Basis of Democracy: American Catholicism, the Church
State Debate, and the Soul ofAmerican Liberalism, 1920-1929, 91 VA. L. REv. 1037 (2005).
44. See WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEw: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY
(1983).
45. JAMES D. HUNTER, To CHANGE THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY & POSSIBILITY OF
CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN WORLD 103 (2010).
46. Id. at 104.
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law and religion. On one side, religious symbols represent a way to link the
logic of the secular state to a religious economy. On the other side, reli-
gious symbols represent an impingement upon an autonomous secular pre-
serve that must stand apart from religion. On such binary terms, the debate
has unsurprisingly been confused and irresolute.
III. RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEOPOLITICAL
CULTURAL WARS
The fragmentation of the American tradition offers a starting point for
assessing the current confused state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In particular, it is argued that one significant reason for the irresolute nature
of debate over religious symbols is that the cases have often rested on a
caricatured dichotomy between the religious and the secular. Even when
the binary is not facially present, it nevertheless shapes the contours of the
legal debate. The Establishment Clause has become the situs of a cultural
debate about the fundamental orientation of American liberalism. 47 IS
America to be a secular nation or a religious nation? Lacking a definition of
the secular through which the culture wars might be blunted, the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence has instead only fed this chaotic, irresolute, and often
incoherent struggle.
Some of these dynamics might be seen in the recent Supreme Court
cases addressing public displays of the Ten Commandments. The debate
between the residue of Christian secularity and its secularist alternative is
not invoked as such, but the opinions traffic in pathways established by
these positions. In the 2005 case Van Orden v. Perry,48 in which the Su-
preme Court upheld a Ten Commandments display on the grounds of the
Texas State Capitol, the plurality opinion goes so far as to frame the over-
arching Establishment Clause issue in binary terms that echo the logic of
Christian secularity and secularism. Justice Rehnquist writes that, "[o]ur
cases Januslike, point in two directions in applying the Establishment
Clause. One face looks toward the strong role played by religion and reli-
gious traditions throughout our Nation's history," while "[t]he other face
looks toward the principle that governmental intervention in religious mat-
ters can itself endanger religious freedom." 49 "One face," Rehnquist con-
47. As one commentator notes, "When Christians rail against the separation of church and state
and heartily charge that those words do not appear in the Constitution, they are really reacting to secu-
larism. The problem is that the language of the separation of church and state is often used to push for
more secularistic understandings." HUNTER BAKER, THE END OF SECULARISM 20 (2009).
48. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
49. Id. at 683.
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tinues, "looks to the past in acknowledgement of our Nation's heritage,
while the other looks to the present in demanding a separation between
church and state."50
In a concurring opinion in Van Orden, Justice Scalia advances an ar-
gument that echoes the basic themes of Christian secularity. He argues, for
instance, that "there is nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring reli-
gion generally, honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment,
or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments." 5'
Scalia goes even further in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union,52 another Ten Commandments case decided the same day as Van
Orden in which the Court found a courthouse display unconstitutional.
Writing in dissent, Scalia argues that the Constitution permits the privileg-
ing of the monotheistic faiths of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.53 At the
heart of this argument is the claim that it is "demonstrably false.. .that the
government cannot favor religion over irreligion" and "cannot favor one
religion over another." 54 Justice Thomas's concurrence in Van Orden re-
veals similar impulses. Taking note of the "incoherence" of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Thomas argues for returning to a nar-
row notion of establishment as compulsion that would leave abundant
space for such activities as the display of religious symbols. He is particu-
larly critical of the Court's tendency "to avoid declaring all religious sym-
bols and words of longstanding tradition unconstitutional, by
counterfactually declaring them of little religious significance."5 5
On one level, this line of argument rests on a series of historical
claims about the Founder's understanding of establishment. But this is not
merely a historical exercise, for this position also discloses a deeper set of
assumptions about the relationship between religion and constitutional
liberties. Particularly revealing is the statement that, "[o]ur institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being."56 Not merely a historical claim, this state-
ment is also pregnant with deeper moral and normative significance that
draws constitutional jurisprudence into contact with the basic insights of
Christian secularity. It is not Christian secularity in a narrow way, but it
participates in the project of linking the logic of the liberal state to theolog-
ical precepts, in this case those represented by the God of the Abrahamic
50. Id.
51. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 894 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 683.
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faiths. The secular is by no means negated by religion, but it does find its
grounding within the moral universe of monotheism.
The dissent in Van Orden, authored by Justice Stevens, is revealing in
that it defines itself, at least in part, against a certain form of Christian or
monotheistically-based secularity. The reading of the First Amendment
presented in the plurality and concurring opinions, Stevens argues, "would
replace Jefferson's 'wall of separation' with a perverse wall of exclusion-
Christians inside, non-Christians out." 57 Rather than allowing the nation to
assume a narrow theological identity, Stevens argues that the Establishment
Clause should be interpreted in terms of the principle of neutrality.58 A
"resolute commitment to neutrality," in turn, "is flatly inconsistent with the
[Van Orden] plurality's wholehearted validation of an official state en-
dorsement of the message that there is one, and only one, God." 59 Stevens's
opinion is not based in a deep secularist agenda, but the neutrality he offers
necessarily demands a conception of the public denuded of religious mean-
ing.
Similar implications arise from the majority opinion in McCreary
County v. American Civil Liberties Union, in which the Court also endorses
neutrality as the central interpretative guide for the Establishment Clause. 60
The Court is clear in stating that neutrality provides that "government may
not favor one religion over another, or religion over irreligion." 61 Against
the dissent's position that "the government should be free to approve the
core beliefs of a favored religion over the tenets of others," 62 Justice Souter
presents neutrality as requiring a rather thoroughgoing removal of state
involvement with sources of meaning that maintain any deep residual reli-
gious significance. Pluralism demands the negation of thick conceptions of
the foundations of the liberal state. Yet, as has been pointed out, the most
significant aspect of the decision in McCreary was its adoption of a revivi-
fied and ultimately stricter form of the Lemon test. One commentator writes
the following: "In Justice Souter's hands, the [secular] purpose prong has
been transformed. Where previously this prong was quite easy to satisfy-a
secular purpose was deemed sufficient-the purpose prong now clearly
57. Id. at 730 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 733.
59. Id. at 712.
60. McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 874 (2005).
61. Id. at 875.
62. Id. at 880.
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requires a predominantly secular purpose." 63 Under this governing princi-
ple, political meaning is sealed from any point of contact with religion.
The lines of argument in Van Orden and McCreary County do not
precisely map onto the conceptions of Christian secularity and secularism,
but they have clearly been shaped by the imaginative universe these tradi-
tions birthed. Both jurisprudential positions draw from well-established
lines of thought, but neither offers an adequate and sustainable intellectual
model by which to untangle the current crisis in Establishment Clause Ju-
risprudence. Defenses of Ten Commandments displays fail to account for
the cultural dynamics of pluralism and unbelief that have radically changed
the landscape of American religion over recent decades. They link Ameri-
can law too intimately and narrowly with particularistic theological pre-
cepts. This approach fails to take account of law's location within a post-
Christian cultural milieu in which there has been a shift from an order
"where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in
which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not
the easiest to embrace." 64 At the same time, an account of law denuded of
religious influence is not politically or culturally viable. It fails to grant
adequate recognition to the deep role that religion holds for American iden-
tity and public life, and it fails in its attempt to impose a normative model
of politics and ethics that is discordant with the pervasive religiosity of the
American people. As such, this approach only further enhances the narra-
tive that "the forces of secularity in contemporary America, within such
institutions as higher education, public education, the news media, advertis-
ing, and popular entertainment, are very powerful and their agenda (delib-
erately or not) is fundamentally at odds with traditional Christian morality
and spirituality."65 The legitimacy of the Court is undermined when it is
understood to be yet another such elite secularist institution. What is thus
needed is a way of rethinking the idea and content of law that moves be-
yond both the anti-religious impulses of secularism and the triumphalist
and exclusionary impulses of theopolitical secularity. Only by cultivating a
new understanding of legal secularism might there emerge an approach to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that overcomes the regnant binary.
63. Jay A. Sekulow & Francis J. Manion, The Supreme Court and the Ten Commandments:
Compounding the Establishment Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 38 (2005) (internal
citations omitted).
64. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 3 (2007).
65. HUNTER, supra note 45, at 167.
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IV. A PLURALISTIC POST-SECULAR HIGHER LAW JURISPRUDENCE
The third way this paper proposes is that of a higher law secularism.
At its most basic, this concept aims to appropriate insights from the two
regnant genealogies of the secular, while equally moving beyond both in
order to advance a new foundation for conceptualizing the meaning of the
Establishment Clause as applied to the issue of religious symbols. Higher
law secularism aims, most basically, to reframe the debate about law and
religion within the context of secular politics. In important respects, the via
media embodied in higher law secularism does not lend itself to clear
summation and line drawing. It rather invites a rethinking of the tone by
which law and religion issues are formulated and deliberated. It is less a
series of systematic principles than a mode of understanding the relation-
ship between religion and politics that shifts the borders of cultural and
legal imagination. In particular, rather than asking whether law should ad-
vance or delimit religious influence in public life, higher law secularism
considers how law can direct religion to shape and support the architecture
of a secular political order. In other words, higher law secularism is prem-
ised on the idea that the binary shaping Establishment Clause jurisprudence
rests on the false premise that law must either defend the goods of religion
or the goods of the secular state. What is rather needed is a jurisprudence
that respects the fundamental independence and achievement of secular
politics, but which nevertheless accounts for the ways in which religion
might contribute to the structure of an open and plural secular order. The
challenge is not to become more or less religious, or more or less secular,
but to become differently secular.
Higher law secularism rests on two broad ideas. First, following the
tradition of Judeo-Christian secularism, it proposes that the secular is not to
be equated with the absence or negation of religion. To do so in sharp ideo-
logical terms ignores the essential role that theological concepts have had
in shaping the legal and political inheritance of the West. 66 As discussed
above, the desacralization of politics that birthed the idea of the secular was
unimaginable apart from Christianity. Higher law secularism seeks to
maintain and renew the idea that the secular might properly remain open to
a theological logic. In fact, not only is the secular properly held open to
religion, but closing it off feeds an ideologically rigid account of the secu-
lar. As such, higher law secularism rejects an account of the secular as
representing a radical rupture within the West. The secular and the reli-
66. See generally NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS (2007).
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gious are historically and intellectually tethered, and higher law secularism
seeks to reconstruct this genealogical point of contact in a new form.
At the same time, higher law secularism opens several important
cleavages with Christian secularity by moving beyond a narrow theological
genealogy of secular politics. Even as Christianity maintained a seminal
role in birthing secular space, due recognition within a pluralistic society
needs to be given to the ways in which the secular has developed a mean-
ingful independence and autonomy that stands apart from and, in certain
respects, in judgment of religion. Higher law secularism is thus distin-
guished from the tradition of Christian secularity in that it rejects the link-
age between the secular and any particular theological worldview. In
contrast to the tradition of Christian secularity, higher law secularism looks
to the goods of religion more generally as a source of insight into the mean-
ing of the secular. In fact, higher law secularism goes even further and
opens the secular to the insights of non-religious forms of deep moral
meaning.67 In brief, higher law secularism resists an account of the secular
as either a purely autonomous place of political meaning or as that which
finds grounding solely within a religious economy.
On one level, the idea of higher law secularism can be properly
viewed as a pragmatic and non-ideological approach to overcoming a deep
and problematic cultural divide. Higher law secularism aims to advance a
compromise between principles often deemed to be oppositional. It seeks,
in particular, to diffuse the notion that the achievement of the secular state,
including state neutrality, is incompatible with the state opening public
space to the expression of particularistic religious and non-religious higher
law claims. Such claims might be understood as an acknowledgment of the
way in which secularism has and might continue to be shaped by higher
commitments. Reaching such a rapprochement therefore does not demand a
negation of the secular but a reimagining of its meaning.
In this respect, higher law secular shares certain features with what
Tariq Modood terms "moderate/inclusive" secularism."68 It is a secularism
shaped with the grain of religion. It equally means that higher law secular-
ism should not be understood as advancing thick normative claims about
the nature of the secular. It is not, in other words, an attempt to settle de-
bates of long and deep consequence between Christian secularity or En-
lightenment secularism. It might not be the case that these regnant positions
67. For such an account of the higher law, see LEDEWITZ, supra note 1, at chapter 5.
68. Taiq Modood, Moderate Secularism: A European Conception, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Apr. 7,
2011,. available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/tariq-modoodomoderate-secularism-european-
conception.
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represent a "false dualism," only that the dualism to which they gave rise
cannot serve as the basis for a constructive jurisprudence within a religious-
ly pluralist and increasingly non-religious society. 69 Neither of the two
positions has provided an adequate framework for resolving issues of reli-
gion and public life. Higher law secularism thus aims to open space within
which there might emerge a prudential accord concerning the ways reli-
gious norms shape secular meaning.
By so doing, higher law secularism reimagines the secular as a site of
dialogical engagement and constructive contestation between moral tradi-
tions. Higher law secularism presents an account of the secular as an ongo-
ing and contested way of encountering and being in the world. It moves the
legal and political conversation beyond the either/or proposition that often
shapes debate and invites a dialectical engagement about the moral life of
secular society. The Establishment Clause becomes a place of encounter,
engagement, and contestation for which there need not be a settled univocal
meaning. Thus higher law secularism, unlike Christian secularity and secu-
larism, does not advance a totalizing conception of the public. It rather
acknowledges the contingent and historically constructed nature of western
secularity, thereby drawing the Establishment Clause into an ongoing dia-
logue about the nation's self-understanding. Higher law secularism enters
into the ambiguities and tensions that define the deeper sources of moral
meaning within the late modem world and allows the secular to become the
sight of a deep and authentic pluralism.
While these pragmatic considerations are at the center of higher law
secularism, the concept is more than a mere via media that aims to diffuse
cultural tension through strategic compromise. Viewed in another way,
higher law secularism embodies a way of reimaging the moral structure of
legal liberalism in relationship to religion. The idea of higher law secular-
ism, in other words, offers a starting point for cultivating what Jeffrey Stout
refers to as a democratic "common morality." 70 There is perhaps no charac-
teristic more emblematic of late modem culture than the pervasive lack of
deep agreement. Yet, there must be constructive alternatives to a politics
defined by either the dictatorship of relativism or the tyranny of univocity.
Secularism's project of privatizing religion and Christian secularity's pro-
ject of reinstantiating a theological politics have only enflamed the culture
wars and politicized the Establishment Clause. A higher law secularism
might therefore be understood as way to cultivate a post-metaphysical poli-
tics that preserves law's openness to deep moral sources and aspirations. It
69. LEDEWITZ, supra note 1, at 143.
70. JEFFREY STouT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 225-45 (2004).
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is a task at once pragmatic- undercutting what Stout has referred to as the
standoff between secular liberals and new traditionalists-but also one that
has the capacity to reframe the character of public discourse.71 It is not so
much a matter of elevating democracy-qua-democracy to the status of an
independent tradition transcendent in its moral possibilities, but rather
viewing democracy as constituted by-and in some measure dependent
upon-the higher moral aspirations of the body politic (religious and non-
religious alike).
Finally, higher law secularism offers resources for addressing the le-
gitimacy problem within late modem liberalism. The battle over church and
state is, at root, a battle about how to understand the nature and aims of
secular politics. Yet, as Steven D. Smith has argued, Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is defined by an incoherence that reflects "a difficulty in
justification."72 This problem of justification is endemic to the secularist
political project and is a problem that post-Christian modernity has failed to
resolve. Christian secularity placed the ultimate meaning and completion of
the secular within a theological narrative. Secular history, as such, main-
tained no final autonomy, even though it maintained its own jurisdictional
space in media res. Secularism, by contrast, rests on the idea of the "En-
lightenment as the end of history." 73 The modem world is a "world without
a story," leaving secular political space with no inherent meaningfulness
and no connection to a drama outside of its own logic. 74 If Christian secu-
larity is problematic in that it gives the secular univocal meaning, secular-
ism is problematic in that it leaves liberal values unwarranted-
"vulnerable" in the words of one commentator.75 Higher law secularism
offers a way to draw legal liberalism into a new moral narrative by con-
necting it with deep and aspirational values that, in their plurality, shape
communal identity. It opens a way for secular law to shape and be shaped
by external moral norms rather than standing apart from any external order.
At the same time, it does so in a way that moves beyond linking legal secu-
larism to a foundationalist theopolitical order.
Within the imaginative possibilities this approach generates might be
found a new way to address Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The issue
of religious symbols is but one area where we might apply the methodolo-
71. Id. at 13.
72. STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 109 (2010).
73. *ADAM SELIGMAN, MODERNITY'S WAGER 131 (2000).
74. Robert Jenson, How the World Lost its Story, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1993,
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2010/03/how-the-world-lost-its-story.
75. Nigel Biggar, What is the Good of Establishment, STANDPOINT, Apr. 2010, available at
http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/3804/full.
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gy of higher law secularism, but it is a particularly useful one for reimagin-
ing the public role of religion with the liberal order. Of course, higher law
secularism does not provide systematic answers to discrete legal questions
such as whether any given display of religious symbols is or is not constitu-
tionally permissible. At the same time, the methodology of higher law
secularism provides a way to address the current quagmire by refraining the
relationship between religious symbols and secular law. In particular, the
underlying concern of higher law secularism is not with whether the secular
finds it logic within a theological system or through the negation of reli-
gious logic. The concern is rather with how particular forms of higher law
meaning contribute to the creation and sustentation of an open, dynamic,
plural, and morally dense secular order. Moving beyond the binary between
religion and the secular, higher law secularism looks to the ways in which
religion can shape the goods of the secular state. As Bruce Ledewitz writes,
in a statement that echoes the central theme here advanced, albeit with a
different accent,
"[w]hen there is a dispute about the secular meaning of religious imagery
in the public square, I suggest the standard by which public religious ex-
pression should be judged is whether it is plausible to view the govern-
ment's use of religious language, imagery, or symbols as endorsing the
principle of higher law or other related, nonreligious themes. 76
Opening secular space to religious symbols, particularly if they ad-
vance plural forms of higher law meaning, need not involve the privileging
of faith over the secular, but might rather represent a way of continuing the
dialectal process through which the secular is given meaning. Viewed in
this light, higher law secularism should be understood to at least potentially
create space for public religious symbols. The principle that such symbols
are fundamentally incompatible with the secular state rests on a view of the
secular as negating religious meaning. Following the idea that religion and
the secular are not basically incompatible, higher law secularism does not
demand the negation of religious meaning for the sake of the secular. At
the same time, higher law secularism resists, against the tradition of Chris-
tian secularity, an account of public religion that narrowly links one faith or
one theological model such as monotheism, with the sustentation of politi-
cal culture. Higher law secularism opens secular political space to religion
but does not define it as the exclusive creation of religion. The secular in-
stead is placed at the intersection of a tension between the secular and the
religious, the different and the common, the given and the not yet. Whether
any arrangement marshals these tensions for the creative development of
76. LEDEWITZ, supra note 1, at 124.
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secular culture is a determination that must be shaped as much by prudence
as principle.
The possibility that religious symbols might be reconciled with higher
law secularism does not diminish the significant problems such an ar-
rangement might generate. There are concerns, for instance, that using
symbols in this manner instrumentalizes religion in the service of the state.
There are also concerns with the way this project blurs jurisdictional lines
between religion and the secular state. Finally, there remains the practical
consideration of whether it is appropriate for courts to be engaged in line
drawing exercises better left to the province of culture than law. There is
therefore an understandable hesitancy in using the idea of higher law secu-
larism to warrant certain public expressions of religion, especially symbols.
All the same, it is manifest that the current legal arrangement is unsus-
tainable and that the crisis in Establishment Clause jurisprudence cannot be
adequately addressed without engaging the underlying crisis in the secular.
"The historical modus vivendi called secularism is coming apart at the
seams," writes William Connolly.77 The "simple belief in the march of
secularization" has faltered and forced a major reassessment of the history
and meaning of the modern project.78 But it is not clear to what this post-
secular condition is giving rise. Certainly there has been a resurgence in
various forms of religion throughout the world, but there has also been a
rise in unbelief and non-traditional belief.79 If it is indeed the case that mo-
dernity pluralizes rather than secularizes, then the current plural religious
landscape, with its complex admixture of belief and unbelief, presents un-
charted challenges for law that cannot be addressed by established catego-
ries and principles. Whether law can effect a new consensus that moves
beyond the culture wars is the question with which we are now confronted.
Higher law secularism offers one possible way to address this challenge. In
the end, there remains a narrow and unstable line between a commitment to
freedom from religion, on one hand, and an acknowledgment that religion
ought also contribute to the secular order in non-supersessionist ways. How
to strike and maintain this balance (and whether religious symbols have any
role in doing so) is a task without easy resolution. Yet it is the foundational
task confronting the Establishment Clause, and it can only be addressed by
shifting constitutional adjudication towards an engagement with legal mo-
dernity's deepest moral possibilities and limitations.
77. CONNOLLY, supra note 24, at 19.
78. SELIGMAN, supra note 73, at 130.
79. See generally JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, GOD IS BACK: HOW THE
GLOBAL REVIVAL OF FAITH IS CHANGING THE WORLD (2009).
2012]1 831
